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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

POLAND: Implications of the Demonstrations

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The leaders of the government and of Solidarity both appear to have come out of demonstrations on Tuesday as losers. The regime will find no grounds for a further relaxation of martial law. Solidarity probably did not prompt enough demonstrators to turn out to persuade the regime it will have to negotiate. Instead, the political stalemate continues, and higher levels of violence are being used. In the coming debates over future tactics, hardliners on one or both sides may be tempted to seize the initiative. [REDACTED]

Premier Jaruzelski probably had hoped that intimidation tactics would keep Solidarity activists and supporters off the streets and allow him to claim success for his efforts to restore social calm. The clashes, apparently the largest since the early days of martial law, will reinforce his caution in reducing martial law restrictions. [REDACTED]

Jaruzelski has consolidated his position and established his centrist policy, but the demonstrations may bring new pressure from conservatives in the party and from the security services for a tougher approach toward the union. These groups may urge him to allow the police to arrest more of the underground activists or even to rescind Solidarity's legal status. Jaruzelski's moderate advisers probably would argue this would be a tactical mistake that would only radicalize those of the underground leadership who have held out some hope for talks with the government. [REDACTED]

Solidarity's Prospects

Although Solidarity leaders can claim a moral victory in the union's showing against overwhelming odds, the union also paid a price for its two weeks of "peaceful demonstrations." The authorities reportedly have

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closed down numerous underground printing presses and arrested scores of people who prepared and disseminated underground literature as well as the founder of Radio Solidarity. [REDACTED]

Many activists who played leading roles in the demonstrations probably were identified and will be interned or arrested. Their loss would hurt the union's ability to maintain contacts among activists and to spread its message to society. [REDACTED]

The demonstrations--and the three deaths--probably also will provoke new debates in the union over tactics. The moderates again will argue that street demonstrations will only lead to reprisals that hurt chances for future activity. The moderates probably will try to create strong factory organizations in preparation for a general strike at some later date. [REDACTED]

The radicals, on the other hand, are likely to argue that the regime's tactics show that pressure has to be maintained. Some could adopt more violent forms of resistance to vent their frustration or to gain revenge. [REDACTED]

Although there has not been a clear trend toward the greater use of physical force, some demonstrators considered using or used more violent tactics. As apparently was the case in Lubin, the security services also showed they will use firearms if seriously threatened. [REDACTED]

Outlook

The government's reaction to the demonstrations provides more evidence that it will use whatever force it deems necessary to quell demonstrations and that it can maintain its physical control. The prospects are poor that the regime will adopt an alternative course, because Jaruzelski probably remains convinced that time is on his side and that he can eventually wear down the opposition's will to resist. [REDACTED]

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Solidarity leaders will be under continued pressure to devise ways to mobilize public discontent to force concessions from the regime. They are unlikely to succeed in the near term. [REDACTED]

Union leaders may be forced out of necessity to concentrate on creating a more secure underground organization that is not so thoroughly penetrated by the security services. The moderates also may become increasingly concerned about finding ways to discourage the new tendency to violence. [REDACTED]

Soviet Reaction

The Soviet media's detailed coverage of the protests and the regime's response reflects Moscow's satisfaction with the measures taken to quell the disturbances. It also provides a sobering picture to the Soviet public that martial law will be necessary for the foreseeable future. [REDACTED]

Soviet leaders probably feel frustrated that martial law has not ended the problems caused by Solidarity, which have troubled them for two years. At the same time, however, their patience does not appear to be wearing thin. [REDACTED]

Although Moscow is willing to back Jaruzelski's policy, Moscow will expect him to continue a forceful policy of dealing with unrest and will resist any sign of significant concessions if he should waver. The Soviets also will continue to blame the West--including its trade sanctions--for Poland's problems. [REDACTED]

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